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I. Introduction
In his famous book, The Economics of Welfare [6], Pigou showed graphically that the
third degree price discrimination does not change total output of a monopoly if the
demand curves in two separate markets are linear. Later, Robinson [7] confirmed
Pigou's proposition mathematically. Recently, Ekelund, Higgins and Smithson [2], Mai
and Shih [4] extended PigouRobinson's analysis to the hiring of labor by a
monopsony. They showed that the wage discrimination doesn't change total
employment of a monopsony if the supply curves of labor in two separate markets are
linear, and that PigouRobinson's proposition applies to the input markets. However,
their analysis is based on the traditional nonspatial setting in which transportation cost
and location decision are insignificant and negligible. It would be interesting and
important to investigate the effect of wage discrimination on employment in a spatial
world.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of wage discrimination on total
employment and plant location of a monopsony in the WeberMoses triangle. It will be
shown that in the spatial economy the PigouRobinson proposition holds if the plant
location is predetermined. However, if the plant location is a choice variable, the wage
discrimination may change total employment even if the supply curves are linear. This
indicates that location decision and transportation cost play an important role in the
determination of wage discrimination on total employment.
II. The Basic Model
Our analysis is based on the wellknown WeberMoses triangular model with the
following assumptions:
(a) A monopsonist employs a single input (labor) located at two separate markets, A
and B, to produce a single output which is sold in a monopolistic market C. The
WeberMoses triangle in Figure 1 depicts the location problem of the firm, [9; 5]. In
Figure 1, the distances a and b and the angle [Pi]/2 [greater than] [Alpha] [greater than]
0 are known, and [Theta] [less than] [Alpha]. The distance between the plant and the
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output market, h, is held constant, thus all points along the arc IJ are the only ones
which are considered as possible plant locations for the monopsony.(1) The plant
location is determined if the value of [Theta] is chosen.
(b) The production function is specified as:
q = f(L) = f([L.sub.1] + [L.sub.2]), [f.sub.L] [greater than] 0, [f.sub.LL] [less than] 0
(1)
where [L.sub.1] is located at A and [L.sub.2] is located at B.
(c) The workers charge f.o.b. prices for labor and the producer charges c.i.f. price for
output. The firm has monopsony power and faces two upward sloping supply curves at
sources A and B, i.e.,
[w.sub.1] = [a.sub.1] + [b.sub.1][L.sub.1], [w.sub.2] = [a.sub.2] + [b.sub.2][L.sub.2]
(2)
where [a.sub.1], [a.sub.2], [b.sub.1] and [b.sub.2] are constant.
(d) The cost of hiring a worker at the plant is the wage rate at source plus the cost of
transporting one unit of labor to the plant, i.e.,
[c.sub.1] = [w.sub.1] + [ts.sub.1], [c.sub.2] = [w.sub.2] + [ts.sub.2] (3)
where t is the constant transportation rate of labor.(2) By the law of cosines the
distance variables [s.sub.1] and [s.sub.2] can be defined as:
[s.sub.1] = [([a.sup.2] + [h.sup.2]  2ah cos [Theta]).sup.1/2] (4)
[s.sub.2] = [[[b.sup.2] + [h.sup.2]  2bh cos([Alpha]  [Theta])].sup.1/2]. (5)
The price of output at the plant is the market price minus the cost of transporting one
unit of output from the plant to the market,
p  rh (6)
where p = p(q) = p[f(L)], and r is the constant transportation rate of output.
(e) The objective of the firm is to choose the profitmaximizing employment and
location.
It is worth mentioning that the inclusion of distance and transportation rate constitutes
the major point of departure from the nonspatial model.
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To investigate the effect of wage discrimination on employment, according to
Silberberg [8] and Mai and Shih [4], we consider the case in which the discriminating
monopsony is posited to maximize profits subject to a constraint that [w.sub.1] 
[w.sub.2] = k where k is a parameter. The advantage of this approach is that, via the
comparative statics, we can see how total employment changes when k moves from
zero to the optimal value. The Lagrangean for this problem is
V = (p  rh)f(L)  [c.sub.1][L.sub.1]  [c.sub.2][L.sub.2] + [Lambda](k  [w.sub.1] +
[w.sub.2]) (7)
where [Lambda], [L.sub.1], [L.sub.2] and [Theta] are choice variables.
Differentiating V with respect to [Lambda], [L.sub.1], [L.sub.2] and [Theta] yields the
following firstorder conditions.
[V.sub.[Lambda]] = k  [w.sub.1] + [w.sub.2] = 0 (8)
[V.sub.L1] = MRP  rh[f.sub.L]  ([w.sub.1] + [ts.sub.1])  [b.sub.1][L.sub.1] 
[Lambda][b.sub.1] = 0 (9)
[V.sub.L2] = MRP  rh[f.sub.L]  ([w.sub.2] + [ts.sub.2])  [b.sub.2][L.sub.2] +
[Lambda][b.sub.2] = 0 (10)
[V.sub.[Theta]] = [ts.sub.1[Theta]][L.sub.1]  [ts.sub.2[Theta]][L.sub.2] = 0 (11)
where MRP = (p + [p.sub.q]q)[f.sub.L] is the marginal revenue product, [s.sub.1
[Theta]] = ah[([s.sub.1]).sup.1/2] sin [Theta] [greater than] 0, [s.sub.2[Theta]] = bh
[([s.sub.2]).sup.1/2] sin([Alpha]  [Theta]) [less than] 0. If the secondorder sufficient
conditions are satisfied, i.e., D (the bordered Hessian determinant) [less than] 0 and
[D.sub.2] (the borderedpreserving principal minor of order 2) [greater than] 0,
equations (8)(11) can be solved for [L.sub.1], [L.sub.2], [Theta] and [Lambda] in
terms of k and [Gamma] = (r, t, a, b, [Alpha], h), where [Gamma] is a vector of the
remaining parameters. This yields
[L.sub.1] = [L.sub.1](k, [Gamma]), [L.sub.2] = [L.sub.2] (k, [Gamma]), [Theta] =
[Theta](k, [Gamma]), [Lambda] = [Lambda](k, [Gamma]). (12)
This completes the model which constitutes our basic framework.
III. Effects of Wage Discrimination
We are now in a position to examine the effects of wage discrimination. First, we
examine the case in which the plant location is predetermined, i.e., [Theta] is constant.
To derive the effect of wage discrimination on total employment, we totally
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differentiate (8)  (10) with respect to [Lambda], [L.sub.1], and [L.sub.2], and use
Cramer's rule to yield
[([Delta][L.sub.1]/[Delta]k).sub.[Theta]=[[Theta].sub.0]] = (1/[D.sub.2])[([b.sub.1] +
[b.sub.2])(MRP[prime]  rh[f.sub.LL])  2[b.sub.1][b.sub.2]] (13)
[([Delta][L.sub.2]/[Delta]k).sub.[Theta]=[[Theta].sub.0]] = (1/[D.sub.2])[([b.sub.1] +
[b.sub.2])(MRP[prime]  rh[f.sub.LL])  2[b.sub.1][b.sub.2]] (14)
[([Delta][L.sub.1]/[Delta]k).sub.[Theta]=[[Theta].sub.0]] = [([Delta][L.sub.1]/[Delta]
k).sub.[Theta]=[[Theta].sub.0]] + [([Delta][L.sub.1]/[Delta]k).sub.[Theta]=
[[Theta].sub.0]] = 0 (15)
[D.sub.2] = (MRP[prime]  rh[f.sub.LL])[([b.sub.1] + [b.sub.2]).sup.2] + 2[b.sub.1]
[b.sub.2]([b.sub.1] + [b.sub.2]) (16)
where [Mathematical Expression Omitted], and [D.sub.2] [greater than] 0 if the
secondorder condition is satisfied. In other words, the wage discrimination will not
change total employment. This indicates that the PigouRobinson proposition holds
when the plant location is predetermined.
Next, we turn to the case in which the plant location is a decision variable. Totally
differentiating (9)(11) and applying Cramer's rule, we obtain
[Delta][Theta]/[Delta]k = (1/D)t([s.sub.1[Theta]]  [s.sub.2[Theta]])[2[b.sub.1]
[b.sub.2]  (MRP[prime]  rh[f.sub.LL])([b.sub.1] + [b.sub.2])] [less than] 0 (17)
[Delta][L.sub.1]/[Delta]k = (1/D){[2[b.sub.1][b.sub.2]  (MRP[prime]  rh[f.sub.LL])
([b.sub.1] + [b.sub.2])][H.sub.[Theta][Theta]] + [ts.sub.2[Theta]]([b.sub.1][ts.sub.2
[Theta]] + [b.sub.2][ts.sub.1[Theta]])} (18)
[Delta][L.sub.2]/[Delta]k = (1/D){[2[b.sub.1][b.sub.2]  (MRP[prime]  rh[f.sub.LL])
([b.sub.1] + [b.sub.2])][H.sub.[Theta][Theta]] + [ts.sub.1[Theta]]([b.sub.1][ts.sub.2
[Theta]] + [b.sub.2][ts.sub.1[Theta]])} (19)
[Mathematical Expression Omitted]
D = [t.sup.2][([b.sub.1][s.sub.2[Theta]] + [b.sub.2][s.sub.1[Theta]]).sup.2] + ([b.sub.1]
+ [b.sub.2])[2[b.sub.1][b.sub.2]  ([b.sub.1] + [b.sub.2])(MRP[prime]  rh[f.sub.LL])]
[H.sub.[Theta][Theta]] (21)
where [H.sub.[Theta][Theta]] = [ts.sub.1[Theta][Theta]][L.sub.1]  [ts.sub.2[Theta]
[Theta]][L.sub.2], and D [less than] 0, if the secondorder sufficient conditions are
satisfied. Clearly, [Delta][Theta]/[Delta]k [less than] 0, but the sign of [Delta]L/[Delta]
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k is in general ambiguous. In other words, the wage discrimination will move the plant
location toward the labor market with higher wage rate, and may change total
employment of a monopsony.
The effect of wage discrimination on employment is, perhaps, surprising. According to
the PigouRobinson proposition, in the nonspatial economy total employment is
unchanged by discrimination if the supply curves are linear. But the above result shows
that the wage discrimination may change total employment in the spatial economy.
The difference results are due to the location effect.
The location effect of wage discrimination on employment can be depicted more
clearly by using the SMFCDMFC (simple monopsonist's marginal factor cost curve
discriminating monopsonist's marginal factor cost curve) approach, [2; 3]. In Figure 2,
MRP  rh[f.sub.L] shows the marginal revenue product minus the marginal
transportation cost of output. SMFC and DMFC show the marginal factor cost plus the
marginal transportation cost of inputs confronting a simple monopsony and that of
confronting a discriminating monopsony. The intersection of MRP  rh[f.sub.L] and
SMFC determines a simple monopolist's total employment, and the intersection of
MRP  rh[f.sub.L] and DMFC determines a discriminating monopolist's total
employment. In the case where the plant location is predetermined ([Theta] =
[[Theta].sub.0]), SMFC is identical to DMFC(3), so total employment is unchanged by
wage discrimination, i.e., [L.sub.d] = [L.sub.s]. However, in the case where the plant
location is a choice variable, the wage discrimination will move the plant location
toward the labor market A. The change of plant location will change the marginal
transportation cost of [L.sub.1] and [L.sub.2]. If the change in marginal transport cost
of [L.sub.1] is greater than that of [L.sub.2], i.e., (1/[b.sub.1])[ts.sub.1[Theta]] [greater
than] (1/[b.sub.2])[ts.sub.2[Theta]], DMFC will shift to the right(4) and intersect MRP
 rh[f.sub.L] such that total employment increase, i.e., [L[prime].sub.d] [greater than]
[L.sub.s], under wage discrimination.(5)
IV. Concluding Remarks
We have attempted to show how the introduction of space and location in the wage
discrimination model may alter the wellestablished PigouRobinson proposition.
Assume that two supply curves are linear. We have shown that if the plant location is
predetermined, the wage discrimination will not change total employment of a
monopsony. In this case, the PigouRobinson proposition holds. We have also shown
that if the plant location is treated as a decision variable, the wage discrimination will
move the plant location toward the labor market with higher wage rate, and may
change employment of a monopsony. This indicates that the PigouRobinson
proposition can not be applied to the spatial economy. The upshot of this analysis is
that firm's location decision and transportation costs have important influence on the
effect of wage discrimination on employment.
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I am grateful to a referee for stimulating criticism and helpful suggestions. All errors
remain with the author.
1. For simplicity, as did Moses [5], we assume that h is held constant. However, our
basic results remain unaffected if h is a choice variable.
2. Following Weber [9] and Moses [5], we assume that "inputs are sold f.o.b.", [5,
260], i.e., the same wage at each source and the firm bears the transportation cost. In
the ease where workers absorb the transportation cost, i.e., the c.i.f. pricing. The supply
of labor can be specified as:
[L.sub.i] = [m.sub.i] + [n.sub.i]([w[prime].sub.i]  [ts.sub.i]).
Rearranging this equation, we obtain
[w[prime].sub.i] = ([m.sub.i]/[n.sub.i]) + (1/[n.sub.i])[L.sub.i] + [ts.sub.i]
= ([a.sub.i] + [b.sub.i][L.sub.i]) + [ts.sub.i]
= [w.sub.i] + [ts.sub.i]
where [w[prime].sub.i] is the wage paid by the firm at source regardless of the
transportation cost, [a.sub.i] = ([m.sub.i]/[n.sub.i]), [b.sub.i] = (1/[n.sub.i]) and i = 1, 2.
Thus, the labor cost would be
[C.sub.i] = [w[prime].sub.i][L.sub.i] = [c.sub.i][L.sub.i].
Clearly, this is identical to the one in the f.o.b. pricing. It can also be shown that the
profit function of the f.o.b. pricing is equivalent to that of the c.i.f. pricing. This result
is consistent with Beckmann and Ingene's in the spatial monopoly market. Beckmann
and Ingene showed that "the profit maximizing problems involved (in the f.o.b.,
pricing and the c.i.f. pricing) are mathematically equivalent when the demand
functions are linear" [1, 327].
3. To verify this proposition, in the case of simple monopsony, we combine equations
(2) and (3) and obtain
L = [L.sub.1] + [L.sub.2] = (1/[b.sub.1][b.sub.2])[[b.sub.2](c  [a.sub.1]  [ts.sub.1]) +
[b.sub.1](c  [a.sub.2]  [ts.sub.2])].
Note that [c.sub.1] = [c.sub.2] = c when the simple monopsony hires workers from
both markets. Solving for c and defining the cost as C = cL, the SMFC function would
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be
SMFC = [1/([b.sub.1] + [b.sub.2])][2[b.sub.1][b.sub.2]L + ([a.sub.1] + [ts.sub.1])
[b.sub.2] + ([a.sub.2] + [ts.sub.2])[b.sub.1]].
In the case of discriminating monopsony, the cost functions for two markets are
[C.sub.1] = [c.sub.1][L.sub.1] and [C.sub.2] = [c.sub.2][L.sub.2]. Differentiating
[C.sub.1] and [C.sub.2] with respect to [L.sub.1] and [L.sub.2], we obtain
[DMFC.sub.1] = [a.sub.1] + [ts.sub.1] + 2[b.sub.1][L.sub.1], [DMFC.sub.2] = [a.sub.2]
+ [ts.sub.2] + 2[b.sub.2][L.sub.2].
Solving for [L.sub.1] and [L.sub.2] and summing horizontally, the DMFC function
would be
DMFC = [1/([b.sub.1] + [b.sub.2])][2[b.sub.1][b.sub.2]L + ([a.sub.1] + [ts.sub.1])
[b.sub.2] + ([a.sub.2] + [ts.sub.2])[b.sub.1]].
It is clear that the SMFC curve is identical to the DMFC curve if the plant location is
given.
4. At the given level of L, the shift of DMFC, as a result of moving plant location
toward market A, is
[Mathematical Expression Omitted],
as
[Mathematical Expression Omitted].
5. To avoid cluttering the diagram, we only demonstrate the case of (1/[b.sub.1])
[ts.sub.1[Theta]] [greater than] (1/[b.sub.2])[ts.sub.2[Theta]]. However, it is easy to
show that the wage discrimination will shift DMFC to the left and decrease total
employment if (1/[b.sub.1])[ts.sub.1[Theta]] [less than]  (1/[b.sub.2])[ts.sub.2[Theta]].
It is also easy to see that DMFC and total employment are unchanged by wage
discrimination if (1/[b.sub.1])[ts.sub.1[Theta]] =  (1/[b.sub.2])[ts.sub.2[Theta]].
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Abstract:
The effects of wage discrimination on total employment and plant location of a
monopsony in the WeberMoses triangle are examined. Findings indicate that location
decision and transportation cost are significant factors in determining wage
discrimination on total employment. This is because in the spatial economy, wage
discrimination does not change total employment of a monopsony if the supply curves
of labor in two separate markets are linear, as Pigou and Robinson proposed, if the
plant location is predetermined. However, the wage discrimination may change total
employment even if the supply curves are linear, if plant location is a choice variable.
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